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ABSTRACT
The recent suit over the validity of gene patents between the
American Civil Liberties Union and Myriad Genetics has
highlighted the troubling ways in which patents may be interfering
with the willingness of scientists and companies to engage in basic
biotechnology research on matters of vital importance to human
health and disease. Many scholars have argued for a legislative
research exemption to protect this sort of research. Theoretically,
the common law already contains an exemption to protect certain
uses of a patented product from being deemed patent infringement.
This Article evaluates the history of the common law research
exemption alongside the history of biotechnology policymaking
since the 1970s, identifying how confusion over the scope of the
judicial research exemption may have led to legislative stagnation
on the issue of protecting research. Even during the infancy of
biotechnology, members of Congress believed in the existence of a
robust research exemption when making policy decisions about
whether to create a legislative exemption. Now that the scope of
the research exemption has been narrowed significantly by recent
Federal Circuit decisions, at a time when the intellectual property
regime permits patents on human building blocks as basic as
genes, this Article highlights the need for a clear exemption. It also
overviews and comments on existing policy solutions scholars have
offered to counteract the chilling effect that the lack of a clear
exemption might be having on basic research, including research
in the biotechnology sector.
* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School (2011). Many thanks to Daniel J. Kevles for
his helpful assistance and comments on this manuscript.
1
Boyle: LEAVING ROOM FOR RESEARCH
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 269 (2010) 2009-2010
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION ............................................................................. 271
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW RESEARCH EXEMPTION274
A. Origins of the Exemption ................................................ 275
B. Subsequent Interpretations of the Exemption Prior to
B io tech .................................................................................. 2 78
II. 1970s AND 1980s: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE BAYH-DOLE
A C T ................................................................................... 2 80
III. 1980s AND 1990s: CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF
THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION .............................................. 285
A. The Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1988 ....... 285
B. Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act
of 19 9 0 .................................................................................. 2 8 9
IV. 2000s: JUDICIAL EVISCERATION OF THE COMMON LAW
EXEM PTION ....................................................................... 293
A . M adey v. D uke ................................................................ 295
B. Integra LifeSciences v. Merck ........................................ 298
V. THE FUTURE OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN
B IOTECHNOLOGY .............................................................. 301
A . L iability R ules ................................................................. 304
B. A "Fair Use" Exemption ................................................ 305
C. Compulsory Licensing, Non-exclusive Licensing, and
P atent P ools .......................................................................... 30 7
D . L eg islation ...................................................................... 308
C ON CLU SION ................................................................................. 309
270
2
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol12/iss1/7
THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RESEARCH
EXEMPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO BIOTECH LAW AND POLICY
INTRODUCTION
In March, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union made
news when its lawsuit against a prominent genetics company-
Myriad Genetics-won its case on summary judgment in a New
York district court,' after surviving an earlier summary judgment
2battle over its standing to bring the suit in November, 2009.
Myriad holds a patent on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, the
presence of which indicate a woman's predisposition to certain
types of cancer. 3 With its patent, Myriad has a monopoly over the
gene, including all diagnostic testing related to it. Women cannot
seek a second opinion and there is no cheaper alternative test;
scientists cannot look at the gene, let alone perform research on it
without Myriad's permission.4 The heart of the ACLU complaint
alleges that Myriad's monopoly over the BRCA genes interferes
with women's health and doctors' practices. But the complaint also
alleges that Myriad's patent prohibits independent, non-
commercial research on the genes from taking place in university
and nonprofit labs.5 Indeed, the other plaintiffs in the ACLU suit
are researchers who received cease and desist letters from Myriad
after engaging in unsanctioned work, work which could have
provided valuable information about the gene itself and
technologies directed to it.6 In preparation for trial, the ACLU
argued that:
[G]ene patents interfere with the ability of
physicians and researchers to investigate complex
diseases. For example, BRCA1/2 may be associated
with cancers other than breast and ovarian cancer,
but so long as the patents on these genes remain, no
one will be able to include these genes in tests for
other disease predispositions.
7
Although the district court ruled for the ACLU summarily
on other grounds relating to the invalidity of Myriad's patents, the
1 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09
Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *108 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
2 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Court Upholds Right of
Scientists and Patients To Challenge Gene Patents (Nov. 2, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech womens-rights/court-upholds-right-scientists-
and-patients-challenge-gene-patents.
3 Complaint at 18, Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology, No. 09 Civ. 4515, available
at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset upload file939_39568.pdf.
4 id. at 18-19.
5 Id. at 6, 28.
6 [d. at 6.
7 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *76-77.
3
Boyle: LEAVING ROOM FOR RESEARCH
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 269 (2010)
court did not rule out the possibility that were a full trial to occur,
it could be proven that Myriad's patents were indeed functioning to
prevent basic, beneficial research from continuing.
8
The clause of the Constitution dealing with patents-
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8--optimistically describes the patent
monopoly as meant to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" by promoting disclosure of novel and useful methods and
inventions. 9 Although patents do encourage the disclosure of
beneficial ideas, patent holders use their patents for a number of
other reasons in modem society: to encourage investor confidence
in a new product or market; to gain bargaining chips for cross-
licenses, sales, mergers, and acquisitions; or defensively, to secure
freedom to work on a new technology or product without fear of
infringement. 10 More detrimentally, a patent holder may engage in
behavior like Myriad's-rarely licensing the patented technology,
but instead enforcing the patent strategically to stifle basic
research, the development of competitive alternatives, and other
non-sanctioned uses. This type of guarded behavior preserves the
patentee's dominance, but may ultimately harm the public by
impeding beneficial research on or with the patented technology.
Long before the advent of biotechnology, the fundamental
importance of experimentation was recognized by the judiciary,
and some research activities were granted qualified immunity from
patent infringement suits. This immunity is known as the "research
exemption" or "experimental use exemption."" Although the
scope of the exemption is and always has been murky, 12 since the
nineteenth century, judges around the country have recognized that
common sense seems to dictate that certain not-for-profit
experimentation should not constitute patent infringement under
the patent statutes.' 3 In recent years, however, the Federal
Circuit-the federal court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over patent suits-has narrowed the common law exemption
substantially, leaving it difficult to discern whether there is any
room for non-commercial research using patented technologies in
8 Id. at *81 ("[T]here exists a sharp dispute concerning the impact of patents
directed to isolated DNA on genetic research and consequently the health of
society.... [T]he resolution of these disputes of fact and policy are not possible
within the context of these motions.").
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How
Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and
Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 437 (2008).
11 The exemption is also called the "research exception" in other literature. I use
it to mean the judicially-created immunity for users of patented technology who
engage in non-commercial research. See infra Part I.
12 See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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universities and nonprofits after the court's recent holdings.
Although the specter of a possible research exemption may have at
least discouraged patent holders from suing non-commercial
experimenters, the Federal Circuit's erosion of the exemption
makes it likely that any non-commercial experimenter, whether
individual or institutional, could risk being sued if her work
involves patented technology.
This Article examines how, historically, the research
exemption has been discussed and relied upon in patent
policymaking, and how the demise of the common law research
exemption relates to practices in the biotechnology industry. Did
the common law research exemption ever really exist? Were
fundamental policy choices made in reliance on it? What results
from the evisceration of the common law exemption, given the
state of current policy toward biotechnology? What should
legislators do about it?
Biotechnology is a particularly vulnerable technology
because of its deep relationship to our understanding of health and
disease. Continued research is vital to confirm the accuracy of
genetic tests, to discover potential flaws and fixes, and to allow
researchers to find suitable alternatives or substitutes if possible. In
an industry so intertwined with life and death, the threat of an
anticommons is particularly worthy of concern. 14 Without the
space and freedom to research, patients, doctors, and society at
large are at the patentee's mercy. A person's health may depend on
the patentee granting licenses, choosing a reasonable price for
products incorporating the monopolized technology, and doing
further research that may improve or cheapen the technology. As
Myriad's behavior has demonstrated, a bad actor has little
incentive to do any of these things. The pro-competitive goal of
patent law is undermined by the anti-competitive effect of patents
on genetic material: with a gene, there is no way to invent around
the patented technology, so the patentee need not fear competition
for the term of the patent. In a competitive environment, the
patentee would be incentivized to do more research, to charge
reasonable prices, and potentially to cross-license the technology.
In an environment free of competition, profit-maximizing behavior
and progress-maximizing behavior may be at odds. 15 A research
14 See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 6918
(1998) (discussing the seriousness of the patent thicket impeding continued
research in the biomedical field).
15 See id. There is some specific evidence that biotechnology patents are being
used to slow progress or impede competition. Lori Andrews has identified a case
in which GlaxoSmithKline pursued a patent on a test which would examine the
effectiveness of one of their drugs, not because they intended to develop the test,
but rather so that no one could do further work on it. Lori B. Andrews, Genes
273
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exemption might help alleviate at least some of these problems,
and legislators and policymakers should consider ways in which
the research exemption might be reinstated and clarified now that
the common law exemption has been eviscerated.
Part I of this Article tells the story of the common law
research exemption as it evolved prior to the advent of
biotechnology. Part II discusses the beginnings of biotechnology
and the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which essentially gave
researchers (including academic and nonprofit researchers) a duty
to commercialize and license their work, a subtle yet dangerous
threat to the underpinnings of the research exemption. Part III
examines the ways in which biotechnology policymakers, aware of
the threats to public health posed by biotechnology patents,
discussed and relied upon the research exemption in their decisions
during the 1980s and 1990s. Part IV overviews the recent
narrowing of the common law exemption and its ramifications,
specifically for the most recent advancement in the modem
biotechnology industry-genetic analysis and testing. Part V sets
forth the solutions that have been advanced by academics
and policymakers to address the current system's chilling
effect on basic, beneficial research, and concludes with some
recommendations for future action.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW RESEARCH
EXEMPTION
Although many authors have discussed the origins of the
research exemption, 16 their interpretations of the exemption vary as
widely as the interpretations advanced by various courts over the
years. This section attempts to briefly overview the history of the
experimental use or research exemption prior to the advent of
biotechnology, highlighting its inconsistent application and
meaning. While perhaps offering no clear answers to questions
about the traditional meaning or scope of the exemption, the
and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE REVIEWS
GENETICS 803, 804 (2002). Progress and profit may not always be in
competition, though; a company that obtains a patent might work to cheapen the
production of the patented biotechnology, or to develop technologies that
enhance the value of the patented product, in cases where the ability to charge
monopoly prices would allow the patent holder to reap additional profits. I thank
Bret Hembd, Executive Editor of the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, for
these suggestions.
16 See Richard Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 357 (1957); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177
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history does demonstrate that there would be at least some basis to
believe that certain applications of patented technology-
particularly uses for the purposes of testing the accuracy of an
invention or testing its proper enablement by the specification-are
protected from infringement because of the absence of harm to the
patentee.
A. Origins of the Exemption
The common law research exemption originated in an 1813
case from Massachusetts, Whittemore v. Cutter. 7 The defendant,
who was charged with infringement for constructing the plaintiffs
patented machine, challenged a jury instruction which stated that
making a machine with "a design to use it for profit" constituted
infringement. 18 Justice Story, sitting in his appellate capacity on
the Massachusetts federal circuit court, affirmed the instruction,
noting that making a patented technology for profit was within the
purview of the Patent Act of 1793; it was not-for-profit use of the
patented technology that might not be covered. Justice Story stated
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects."'
19
Justice Story thus believed that Congress intended to punish
persons deriving profit from their use of the invention, but not
those who used the patent for certain other purposes.
Justice Story again discussed the issue of profit as a
component of infringement just five months later in Sawin v.
Guild, another Massachusetts circuit court case.2 0 The defendant, a
deputy sheriff, seized and sold the plaintiffs patented nail cutting
machine as part of an execution of the plaintiffs debts. In holding
that this was not infringement, Justice Story referenced Whittemore
in dicta while remarking that the Act of 1793 had already been
construed. He stated that
[For] the making of a patented machine to be an
offence within the purview of [the statute], [it] must
17 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). The history of the research
exemption has been given full treatment by many scholars. Particularly detailed
histories can be found in Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use
Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for
University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917
(2004); and Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement:
The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991).
18 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
19 Id
2021 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
275
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be the making with an intent to use for profit, and
not for the mere purpose of philosophical
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification. In other words, that the making
must be with an intent to infringe the patent-right,
and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of his
discovery.",
2 1
One commentator has interpreted these two 1813 cases to mean
that Justice Story believed that the experimental use exemption
consisted of two separate requirements: "(1) the activity must not
be performed with the intent to gain profit and (2) the activity must
be either (a) for philosophical experiments or (b) for ascertaining
the verity and exactness of the specification."
22
While it may be easy enough to look at the question of
intent, and it is a matter of fact whether the use was for
ascertaining "verity" or "exactness," the problem lies in
interpreting what Justice Story meant by "philosophical
experiments." One interpretation would be that Justice Story
contemplated only a man "tinkering around" in his basement with
another's invention; however, it seems unlikely that Justice Story
would have limited philosophical experiments to such an invisible,
individual use.23  Another view states that "philosophical
experiments" would include use of the invention in the course of
developing new technologies, although this would seem to extend
directly to future for-profit uses that Justice Story would likely
consider infringement.
24
Rebecca Eisenberg has advocated an interpretation
somewhere in the middle of these two extremes: "[t]he first prong
of Justice Story's experimental use privilege, permitting
'philosophical experiments' . . . seems to permit subsequent
researchers to use the patented invention at least in traditional basic
research with no commercial implications." 25 Eisenberg defines
21 Id. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
22 Karp, supra note 17, at 2171.
23 Bee, supra note 16, at 367.
24 Chisum, supra note 16, at 1019 n.203. This view is probably the weakest. The
nineteenth century case Poppenhusen v. Falke held that use of patents to
develop future technology is not protected, and similar fact patterns were also
held not to be experimental uses by other courts. 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279) ("[The defendants] are rivals of the
complainant in the very business to which his patents relate .... The answer
alleges that all the defendants have thus far done since the organization of said
company, has been done by way of experiment, for the purpose of hereafter
working under certain patents, grants, and licenses of their own ... it can hardly
be necessary for the respondents to experiment with the complainant's
inventions in order to perfect their own .. .
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"basic research" as "'pure' research directed solely toward
expanding human knowledge, as opposed to 'applied' research
directed toward solving practical problems." 6 Eisenberg's
definition encompasses the basement inventor, but leaves out
researchers who use the invention for eventually for-profit
purposes. More importantly for this inquiry, Eisenberg's
interpretation exempts researchers who aim to test an invention or
use it to add to human knowledge and understanding, a more
liberal construction of "philosophical experiments" than one which
would protect only the casual, curious experimenter in his
basement. Eisenberg's definition is also consistent with the more
recent research done by Janice Mueller, who evaluated other
nineteenth century uses of the word "philosophical" and suggested
that "philosophy referred to natural philosophy, which in turn
meant science generally." 27 Under this definition, "philosophical
experiments" might thus cover scientific research on a patented
invention to ascertain its workings and to either evaluate them or
attempt to design around them.
In any case, by the close of the nineteenth century, it was
almost unanimously agreed that a narrow exemption for
experimental use existed at common law.28 One nineteenth century
treatise on patents stated that "where [the invention] is made or
used as an experiment, whether for the gratification of scientific
tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the
patentee are not antagonized., 29 The experimental use exemption
was narrow from the outset-even prior to 1900, courts typically
found that various uses of patented inventions by commercial
infringers were not experimental-but even in the cases where the
courts found no experimental use, the courts acknowledged that
some exemption did exist for not-for-profit uses. As early as
26Id at 178 n.1.
27 Mueller, supra note 17, at 929.
28 But see Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., 84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898) (holding that
contracts were required even to conduct experimental testing); Albright v.
Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., 1 F. Cas. 320 (C.C.N.J. 1877) (No. 147);
Palmer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 432 (1885), aff'd on other grounds, 128 U.S.
262 (1888). These latter two cases held that clearly experimental uses-one,
testing the performance of patented molds in the process of manufacturing
trimming, and the other, testing a knapsack for its wartime practicality-were
indeed infringements. However, the majority of cases both before and after
followed Story's logic rather than these aberrant holdings.
29 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 898 (1890).
30 See U.S. Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F. 343, 351 (C.C.W.D. Penn.)
(holding that "use in the course of business and for profit" is not experimental),
aff'd without opinion, 90 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1898); Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v.
Derboklow, 87 F. 997, 999 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898) (acknowledging a "legitimate
use for experimental purposes only"); Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F.
277
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1861, one court even called it "well settled" that an experimental
use exemption existed at common law,31 but the conflicting
interpretations later given in courts around the country demonstrate
that the scope of that exemption and the nature of the activities that
would fall under it were hardly clear.
B. Subsequent Interpretations of the Exemption Prior to
Biotech
As is evident from the limited history thus far, the scope of
the exemption was murky from its outset. Although most courts
recognized that, according to common sense, some experimental
use could not have been intended to be infringement by the
legislature, they frequently conflicted in their interpretations of
what exactly permissible experimentation was or would be. This
pattern of inconsistent interpretation continued for the majority of
the early twentieth century, 32 and overwhelmingly, plaintiffs
prevailed against a defendant's claim of experimental use.
33
However, one interesting pattern during this period is of note:
although strictly commercial enterprises were almost never
exempted on the grounds of experimental use, in those cases in
which experimental use was found, the defendant was the U.S.
government, a frequent government contractor, or a nonprofit
educational institution.
The educational institution absolved from infringement was
the Colorado School of Mines. The school and its faculty and
students were released from liability in a 1935 decision, Ruth v.
Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co. 34 The disputed technology was a
certain type of patented flotation machine. Although the named
defendant, a commercial enterprise, was found guilty of
206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896) ("It is true that, if an infringing machine is made
or used as an experiment merely, it does not infringe former patents.");.
31 Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No.
11,279) ("It has been held, and no doubt is now well settled, that an experiment
with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or
curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee.").
32 See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03(1)(b) (2010); see also
Steven P. Caltrider & Paula Davis, The Experimental Use Defense: Post-Madey
v. Duke and Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 1011 (2004) (providing an overview of the parameters
of the exemption in individual cases throughout this period). In his 1957 article,
Richard Bee also has a very detailed (although overwhelmingly critical) case-
by-case description of these continuously inconsistent interpretations of
experimental use. Bee, supra note 16, at 370-75.
33 See Bee, supra note 16, at 377; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 222.
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infringement, the school (which bought parts from the company)
was immune from liability because the school used the technology
in "laboratory machines used for experimental purposes, and
consequently did not contribute to an infringing use."35 Although it
is not completely clear what the type of experimentation was, the
court seems to have overlooked the fact that even educational
institutions are in a sense commercial, in that they are in the
business of attracting students and endowment investors. The court
seems only to have considered that the use of the technology was
in the lab and was for the purpose of satisfying scientific inquiry,
an educational and experimental activity which it held to be
exempt.
In addition to covering educational use of patented
technology, the exemption seems also to have covered some work
for government research.36 Although not explicitly for government
use, one wartime case, Dugan v. Lear Avia, involved a type of
technology for a direction-finding and position-indicating system
in airplanes, and since Lear was an essential government contractor
during World War II, one might imagine that the suit had
implications for national defense.37 Although the case was decided
on other grounds-the invalidation of the plaintiffs patents-the
court stated that "defendant built [one of the allegedly infringing]
device[s] only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured
it for sale nor sold any." 38 The device was only constructed to
understand how it worked-a form of reverse engineering and
industrial research that the court stated would be free from liability
under the experimental use exemption. The exemption covered
more obvious, explicit government research in a later case which
found the United States not guilty of infringement: Chesterfield v.
United States.39 In dicta, the court referenced the experimental use
exception, stating that the government's use of an alloy as part of
government experiments was not infringement; unfortunately, it is
completely unclear how or for what purpose the technology was
used.40 The court stated only that "a portion of the 422-19 alloy
procured by the defendant was used only for testing and for
35 Id. at 703.
36 I contrast this to work for government use-for example, use of the
technology in warfare or as part of national defense. This type of use is clearly
not experimental or research-based, and the "experimental use" defense has
failed for the government in these situations. See Pitcairn v. United States, 547
F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Palmer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 432 (1885).
37 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
38 Id. at 229.
39 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
40 Id. The patent was invalidated in this case, so the experimental use discussion
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experimental purposes, and there is no evidence that the remainder
was used other than experimentally. Experimental use does not
infringe." 41 The issue in both Dugan and Chesterfield seems to be
whether the invention was being used by the government or a
contractor in a strictly non-commercial sense: testing the
sufficiency of an item for its own sake, or reverse engineering an
item to see how it works without the intention of producing a copy.
Although these decisions indicate that courts were perhaps
more likely to find a nonprofit or governmental entity engaged in
basic research to be protected by the experimental use exemption,
the application and construction of the exemption remained far
from clear prior to the 1970s. There appears to have been some
recognition that functionally non-commercial enterprises-
university research, and perhaps certain research by the
government-should not give rise to liability for the use of
patented technology in non-commercial ways. However, in ways
unforeseen, the lines between commercial and non-commercial
were about to be blurred. With an action as small in scale as the
introduction of DNA into a host bacterium, the business of
biotechnology was on its way.
II. 1970s AND 1980s: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT
Biotechnology is generally defined as "any technique that
uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify
products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop
microorganisms for specific uses."42 Beginning in the mid-1970s,
with advances in genetic technology, the contemporary
biotechnology industry was born. Molecular biologists researching
recombinant DNA-a method of splicing, cloning, and isolating
genetic material-quickly realized its implications and possibilities
for the future of scientific research, given that they now possessed
the ability to single out DNA segments and analyze their structure
and function. 43 However, as recombinant DNA technology became
widespread, many others, including patent attorneys for
universities, speculative venture capitalists, and even enterprising
scientists themselves, recognized the commercial possibilities of
recombinant DNA technology.44 The rise of biotechnology and the
41Id at 845-46.
42 Frank E. Young, Harvesting the Fruits of Biotechnology, FDA CONSUMER,
Sept. 1, 1987, at 2.
43 Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of DNA: The First Major Patent in
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battles the fledgling industry faced have been extensively
chronicled and analyzed.45 Although biotechnology faced a
number of detractors who feared its capabilities and hazards, many
viewed biotechnology as an industry with the ability to stimulate
much-needed domestic economic growth.46 In 1980, when news
broke that one of the earliest biotechnology companies, Genentech
(a combination of the first syllables of "genetic engineering
technology"), had produced synthetic insulin with recombinant
DNA technology, its stock price more than doubled on the day it
went public.47 Start-up companies sold promises of medical
miracles to their investors, and established pharmaceutical and
chemical companies began investing millions in biotechnology
research and development. 48 The fruits of the biotechnology
industry include the creation of many synthetic hormones with
profound implications for human health, and in the following
decades, genetic testing used to indicate biological predisposition
for certain diseases.
The term "industry" brings to mind the private sector and
private development, but from its very beginnings, the public and
nonprofit sectors were at the heart of the biotech industry. It was
an academic lab at Stanford University that spawned recombinant
DNA technology, not a private-sector team of inventors.
49
Academic molecular biologists were increasingly courted by
biotechnology corporations with promises of funding and profits.
50
In addition, and perhaps most troubling, academic scientific
research was largely being funded by the government. The
National Institutes of Health, Department of Defense, Department
of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National Science
Foundation, and other federal groups spent billions of dollars on
university research and development over the course of the 1970s
and 1980s.51 Alerted to the conflicts of interest inherent in public
money funding private enterprise, members of the media began to
cover biotechnology with no shortage of skepticism and
cynicism.52 The concerns largely fell into two categories: first,
45 See SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS AND SOCIETY: THE RISE OF
INDUSTRIAL GENETICS (1991); Hughes, supra note 43; Daniel J. Kevles, The
Battle over Biotechnology, in DAYS OF DESTINY 453 (Alan Brinkley & James M.
McPherson eds., 2001).
46 KRIMSKY, supra note 45, at 25.
47 Daniel J. Kevles, Principles, Property Rights, and Profits: Historical
Reflections on University/Industry Tensions, 8 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 293,
298 (2001).
48 KRIMSKY, supra note 45, at 30-37.
49 Hughes, supra note 43, at 541-42.
50 KRIMSKY, supra note 45, at 60.
51Id. at 66-68.
52 Id. at 70-71.
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concerns over the "commingling of funds" and whether scientists
were using publicly funded labs and materials for commercial
work, and second, the concern that private companies were
appropriating the profits and the fruits of publicly funded academic
research, making the public "pay twice for its investment."
53
Congress took notice of the controversies and the
excitement surrounding biotechnology. Initially, Congress's focus
was on regulation and driven by safety concerns; 54 however, as
private firms found success with commercial applications of
recombinant DNA technology, Congress recognized that biotech
could provide a serious boost to the American economy, and thus
began to focus on ways the government could support the industry
and ensure American dominance.55 Long before the 1970s, both
universities 56 and the government 57 had encouraged the patenting
of publicly funded research results. However, in the 1970s, two
factors were different: first, the amount of federal money in R&D
had increased dramatically, 58 and second, the profits to be gleaned
from the exploitation of biotechnology research were absolutely
enormous compared to the paltry amount universities received
from controlling and licensing their pre-biotechnology patents.
59
As the biotechnology frenzy swept the U.S. economy, the
government was not equipped to quickly commercialize the results
of the research it funded; besides, the commercial infrastructure
was set up already by private biotech companies and start-ups. The
nexus between government and the private sector was nonprofit
and university research, but with the amount of funding and profits
at stake, clear guidelines for ownership and transfer of technology
from the universities to the private sector were needed.
Hence, Congress took action, first, to enable universities to
retain ownership in the results of their federally funded research,
and second, to facilitate (and all but mandate) the transfer of that
technology to the commercial private sector. In 1980, Congresspassed two pieces of legislation-the Stevenson-Wydler
13Id. at71.
54 Hughes, supra note 43, at 566-68.
55 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6460.
56 See Kevles, supra note 47.
57 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1677-84 (1996) (discussing initiatives from the 1960s and earlier to
encourage the patenting of inventions created with government funding).
58 Kevles, supra note 47, at 298.
59 Id at 298-99.
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Technology Innovation Act6 and the Bayh-Dole Act62 in order
to encourage the commercial development of university and
government discoveries, promote the creation of new jobs, and
thereby stimulate the U.S. economy.6 3 The Bayh-Dole Act, also
known as the University and Small Business Patent Procedures
Act, has had a lasting effect on the university's role in the patent
system; it grants universities-as opposed to government
agencies-title in inventions made with government funding,
provided that these universities satisfy a number of requirements,
including obtaining patents in the technology and actively pursuing
"practical application," or the commercial development of the
invention, through licensing if necessary. The Bayh-Dole Act was
Congress's response to what U.S. universities perceived as a lack
of clarity about their rights in federally funded technology,64 and
moreover, to a fear that beneficial research would languish in
university labs that lacked the tools to commercialize it.65 In
addition to giving universities clearer rights and duties, the Act
also provided the government with "march-in rights" to grant
licenses to other contractors regardless of the patentee university's
willingness to license, if deemed necessary to hasten
commercialization, "meet requirements for public use," or
"alleviate health and safety needs." 66 By requiring universities to
find commercial outlets for their patented research (or else face
government intrusion), the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act have
been interpreted by universities as creating an "implied duty to
commercialize" any inventions or technologies created with public
money.
67
Although the congressional hearings contained discussions
about whether patent rights would be allocated to the government
or the universities, Congress does not seem to have discussed the
dedication of the developed technologies to the public domain.
From the outset, patent protection was viewed as the best means
for facilitating technology transfer, as opposed to open sharing of
61 Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3714 (2006)).
62 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-212).
63 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1663-65.
64 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 1-2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6461-62.
65 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1663-64.
66 35 U.S.C. § 203. The march-in rights may be exercised against the university
and against licensees, despite the provisions of any existing contracts.
67 For an extended discussion of the implied duty to commercialize, see Jennifer
A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Academia, Industry, and the Bayh-Dole Act: An
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university- or nonprofit-developed inventions and methods. There
is only a hint that some senators may have been considering public
dedication in the remarks of Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX),
contained in the house report on the Bayh-Dole bill:
My concern is simply the role of the government
and the rights of the people in the patent process.
When a private company risks its own money to
develop new products and procedures it deserves
and receives the profits that may result. There
should not be a different standard applied when it is
the government that risks the taxpayers' money. The
rewards of successful research and development
conducted at government expense should go to all
the people.68
The final form of the bill ensured the opposite: universities were to
hold patents that would be licensed to private firms and
developers. By the early 1980s, many universities had already
established deep ties to the commercial sector.69 In 1980, the
Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty encouraged
further ties and investment in university biotech research, by
clarifying that living material was not per se unpatentable subject
matter.7 0 Chakrabarty paved the way for universities to work
toward patents on DNA material, microorganisms, and farther
down the road, even higher life forms.
7 1
With the advantage of hindsight, it is now apparent that the
creation of a "duty to commercialize" stands in direct conflict not
only with certain academic norms,7 2 but also with the university's
function as a center of basic research.73 Before the 1970s and
1980s, the experimental use exception may have protected
universities from being liable for their research work using
patented technologies-at the very least, the exception was murky
enough that patent holders might not have been willing to gamble
time and money to sue universities and nonprofits. But the passage
68 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6488 (emphasis added).
69 Kevles, supra note 47, at 303.
70 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
71 For a history of the patenting of animals, see Daniel J. Kevles, The Advent of
Animal Patents: Innovation and Controversy in the Engineering and Ownership
of Life, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ANIMAL BREEDING AND
GENETICS 17, 17-30 (Max Rothschild & Scott Newman eds., 2002).
72 For example, norms encouraging the sharing of research, or the independence
and integrity of chosen research projects. See Eisenberg, supra note 16; Kevles,
supra note 47.
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of the Bayh-Dole Act blurred the line between basic research and
applied research in this setting, leaving it difficult to determine
whether certain types of research on patented technologies in
university or nonprofit labs would constitute infringing uses. In
biotechnology, the stakes were financially high, but additionally, in
fields touching public health and disease, the progress of certain
kinds of research are critical: verifying and testing health-related
technologies and methods, or encouraging and developing new
ideas to design around preexisting inventions. After Bayh-Dole,
with universities becoming heavily invested in commercialization,
the ability of the experimental use defense to cover basic nonprofit
and university research was jeopardized. But policymakers
believed that an exemption existed, and that it would protect
valued types of research. Indeed, in considering regulation and
guidance for the development of the biotechnology industry in the
1980s and 1990s, legislators seem to have relied on the existence
of the common law research exemption to ensure that critical and
beneficial basic research would continue.
III. 1980s AND 1990S: CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING
OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION
In the legislative history of the Bayh-Dole Act, there is a
notable absence of concern about the protection of university and
nonprofit research activities. However, Congress was confronted
again with biotechnology policy questions (including questions
about the "experimental use" protection for basic research) in the
subsequent decade, most notably during the debates on the
patenting of transgenic animals and attempts to pass policies which
would clarify U.S. patent law and bring it into line with global
practices. This Part will examine the legislative history
surrounding two bills in particular-the Transgenic Animal Patent
Reform Act of 198874 and the Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act of 199075-neither of which was
ever enacted. Although they never became law, the legislative
history of the bills preserves the ways in which members of
Congress discussed the value of university and nonprofit research,
perceived the research exemption, and made choices about the
codification of the common law exemption in proposed legislation.
A. The Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1988
It was not too long before the advancement of
biotechnology rendered scientists able to genetically modify higher
285
74 H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988).
75 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).
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life forms which satisfied the criteria of patentability-cancer-
susceptible mice, for example, or genetically modified pigs capable
of producing more meat.76 The technology involved in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty was a kind of bacteria,77 perhaps more easily viewed
as a patentable man-made composition of matter than as a living,
breathing animal. Moral and environmental opposition to the
patenting of these higher life forms again drew the attention of
Congress to the biotech industry. Congress thus began to consider
whether a moratorium on the granting of animal patents would be
appropriate, and moreover, whether and what guidelines were
necessary to govern patentability and infringement questions with
regard to animal patents specifically. 78 Representative Robert
Kastenmeier (D-WI), Chairman of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee that handled patents, held hearings on the issue and
began formulating a bill to cover the patenting of transgenic
animals, called the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act.
79
Prior to the drafting of the bill, in the hearings held by the
Committee on the Judiciary, a statutory "research exemption"
came up in the testimony of three individuals: Robert Merges, a
professor of law at Columbia, Reid Adler, a patent attorney at
Finnegan Henderson in Washington, D.C., and Leo Walsh, dean of
the College of Agriculture at the University of Wisconsin.
80
Ostensibly, the research exemption was suggested because such an
exemption would mirror the exemption Congress inserted in the
Plant Variety Protection Act of 197081 (PVPA).
Unfortunately, there is very little legislative history
clarifying why the research exemption appeared in the PVPA. It
seems likely that legislators included the research exemption
because it was mandatory if the United States wished to become a
member of the International Union for the Protection of New
76 Kevles, supra note 71, at 19-2 1.
77 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
78 Kevles, supra note 71, at 23-26.
79Id at24, 28.
80 H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 12-14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1,
12-14.
81 Id. at 12 ("Both [a farmer's exemption and a research exemption] are
paralleled in legislation Congress passed under the Plant Variety Protection
Act.").
82 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1605 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082.
Section 114 of the bill-covering the "research exemption"-is explained in the
report only by the statement that "[u]se and production for research is not to
constitute infringement." Id. at 5093. Section 111 of the bill-covering the
"infringement of plant variety protection" clarifies that "[u]se of the protected
variety as one source of germ plasm to breed a novel variety is permissible"
under the research exemption, id, seeming to indicate that Congress wished to
protect the ability of experimenters to design around the patented variety to
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Varieties of Plants" (UPOV). UPOV is an intergovernmental
organization which encourages intellectual property protection for
plant breeders' creations internationally.8 4 The organization sets
forth uniform legal standards that member nations must comply
with-one of which is a robust research exemption.8 5 The reason
for the exemption may be as simple as this: in order for the United
States to join UPOV, and gain the attendant benefits of
membership, Congress passed the PVPA with the required
research exemption. But post-hoc rationalization of the inclusion
of the research exemption is also instructive for interpreting how
later legislators understood the importance of the exemption. After
the passage of the PVPA, legislators have stated that the exemption
exists because (1) there was concern about granting private entities
exclusive control over federally funded technology, and a research
exemption alleviated this concern,86 and (2) they were trying to
protect valuable germplasm from being locked up in patents,
preventing experimenters from using patented germplasm as a
source to develop novel and diverse varieties of plants.
8 7
The latter reason is strikingly evocative of the fair use
doctrine in trademark law, which prevents the holder of a
trademark from removing particular language from public
discourse (or controlling use of the language) on First Amendment
grounds.8 8 Similarly, experimental use in the PVPA seems to try to
prevent a patent holder from removing important germplasm from
the collection of germplasm available to plant breeders.
83 See Anne E. Crocker, Will Plants Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on
an International Level? A Look at the History of U.S. and International Patent
Law Regarding Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely Changes After the
U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 8
DRAKE J. AGRiC. L. 251, 256-80 (2003).
84 Int'l Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, What It Is, What It
Does (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/about/pdf/pub
437.pdf.
85 Crocker, supra note 83, at 81-83.
86 H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 32 (1990) ("This amendment [creating a research
exemption in the PVPA] was made, in part, because of the involvement of
publicly funded research on plants.").
87 This is supported by congressional debate surrounding the Plant Variety
Protection Act Amendments of 1993: "The research exemption [in the 1970 bill]
was included to promote the free flow of germplasm-essential to the
maintenance of genetic diversity." 139 CoNG. REC. S10841-02, S10868 (daily
ed. Aug. 7, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kerrey). It is also supported by the "design
around" provisions. See supra note 82.
88 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the fair use doctrine in relationship to the First Amendment). For a
more thorough discussion of the relationship between trademark fair use and the
research exemption in PVPA, see Mark D. Janis & Stephen Smith,
Technological Change and the Design of Plant Variety Protection Regimes, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557, 1563-65 (2007).
287
19
Boyle: LEAVING ROOM FOR RESEARCH
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 269 (2010)
Germplasm and genetically modified animals share basic
similarities, in that they are composed of identifiable genetic
material and thus tied to life and the environment; it seems
deleterious to permit patents to remove basic building blocks of
life from the research scientist's tool kit, whether those building
blocks are germplasm or genetic sequences. While this theory is
completely speculative, perhaps this connection between plants
and animals motivated Merges, Adler, and Walsh to suggest that a
research exemption comparable to the one in PVPA be included in
any legislation covering transgenic animal patenting.
Adler and Walsh went into deeper detail than Merges on
the scope of the proposed statutory research exemption. Walsh
expressed fears that animal patents would concentrate valuable
resources in the hands of a few patentees and licensees, and thus
recommended the legislation include "a university research
exemption, compulsory licensing of the patent, public research
focusing efforts on helping the smaller firms stay competitive in
the market place, [and] public institutions cooperating in
establishing and maintaining a gene bank," among other
suggestions which would protect university and nonprofit
research.89 Adler seems to have argued that although a common
law exemption existed, a statutory exemption was necessary
because "the boundary between permissible research uses and
impermissible infringement [was] not totally clear" from the case
law. 90 He further expressed concerns that because of the
ambiguous precedents, courts might not recognize basic research
on transgenic animals as exempt, even when "no direct commercial
benefit" was at stake for the research scientists. 91 The record thus
demonstrates that Congress was warned by a few prominent
advocates that a research exemption would be necessary in order to
keep valuable genetic information in the public domain for basic
research purposes.
Yet prior to the bill's passage by the House of
Representatives, the House Committee on the Judiciary deleted a
proposed statutory research exemption. The reason: "a statutory
exception was unnecessary in light of the existing judicially
fashioned doctrine."92 It was not oversight or lack of consideration
that kept the Act from including a research exemption: it was
reliance on the existence of a common law "experimental use"
exemption that would protect basic research activities from
constituting infringement.
89 H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 14.
90Id. at 13
91 d.a
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The Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act died in the
Senate after being passed in the House. 93 However, the debate
about the Act is instructive for viewing how contemporary
legislators viewed the function and strength of the experimental
use doctrine. Two years later, in the debates surrounding another
bill advanced by Kastenmeier, it would become even clearer that
legislators believed that a robust common law research exemption
existed.
B. Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation
Act of 1990
The Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation
Act of 1990 was broadly intended to "improv[e the] country's
patent law." 94 Like the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, the
bill was introduced by Kastenmeier, and it contains sections
regulating everything from inventions made in space to genetically
engineered animals. 95 For our purposes, the critical component of
the bill is Title IV, which would have created a statutory research
exemption for basic scientific research activities. Title IV of the
Patent Competitiveness Act would have amended 35 U.S.C. § 271,
a section of the patent law, by adding a subsection which would
state that "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a
patented invention solely for research or experimentation
purposes."
96
To contextualize the drafting of Title IV, it is essential to
realize that the legislators viewed the bill as "an attempt to codify
and clarify current case law in the United States which currently
excludes experimental use or research as an act of infringement,"
and stated that it was a "central tenet of American patent law that
there is a right to use scientific information to create new and
better inventions in competition with the patented invention."
97
Legislators thus did not see the bill codifying the research
exemption as a departure from current case law, but rather as the
legislation of an already existing common law exemption.
The report by the House Committee of the Judiciary on the
bill contains some clarification of which activities would constitute
protected research and which would not.
[T]he making or using of a patented invention
solely for research or experimentation shall not be
93 Kevles, supra note 71, at 28.
94 H.R. REP. No. 10 1-960, at 1 (1990).
95 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).
96 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. § 402 (1990).
97 H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 32.
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an act of patent infringement unless the patented
invention has a primary purpose of research or
experimentation. If the patented invention has a
primary purpose of research or experimentation
(such as a transgenic mouse used for cancer
research or a laboratory implement such as a
microscope), it shall not be an act of infringement to
manufacture or use one of these inventions to study,
evaluate, or characterize it or to create a product
outside the scope of the patent covering the
particular invention.98
The House Report identified six additional examples of
"experimental use":
(1) testing an invention to determine its sufficiency
or to compare it to prior art;
(2) tests to determine how the patented invention
works;
(3) experimentation on a patented invention for the
purpose of improving on it or developing a further
patentable invention;
(4) experimentation for the purpose of "designing
around" a patented invention;
(5) testing to determine whether the invention meets
the tester's purposes in anticipation of requesting a
license; and
(6) academic instructional experimentation with the
invention.
99
These permissible uses fall broadly into two groups: (1) research
on the technology, or in other words, evaluations and studies of the
technology itself; and (2) use of the patented technology in an
effort to design around the technology. Both seem to fit within at
least some interpretations of Justice Story's original formulation,
100
and moreover, both are important parts of biotechnology research.
Indeed, the clarification of biotechnology policy was
expressly mentioned as reason to support the statutory
exemption. 10  Citing the progress of university-industry
partnerships following the Bayh-Dole Act, the House Report stated
that allowing scientists and researchers to remain confused over
98 d
99 Id at 35-36.
100 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
101 H.R. REP. No. 101-960 at 34-35 ("The field of biotechnology would
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which research activities were permissible and exempt would be
"contrary to sound public policy."'1 2 In addition to alleviating
confusion, legislators cited two other main reasons to support a
statutory research exemption for biotechnology: first, the
prevalence of public funding in the biotechnology industry, and
second, the fear that basic testing activities would be sent to
countries with robust research exemptions, such as Japan and the
countries in Western Europe. 103 To indicate the widespread support
for a statutory research exemption in biotechnology, the House
Report quotes professors, economists, and scientists, all in support
of the proposition that without a clear exemption, "[u]nnecessary
litigation occurs, excessive threats are levelled, transaction costs
are raised, and experimentation and research are chilled.'
0 4
Though legislators emphasized that legislating an
exemption would merely be codification of the case law, the House
Report also identified a strong tradition within Congress of
supporting statutory research exemptions, evidenced by the PVPA
and the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 (commonly called the Hatch-Waxman Act). The House
Report states that the PVPA research exemption "was made, in
part, because of the involvement of publicly funded research on
plants," and suggests that Title IV was thus appropriate because, as
of 1990, "more than 50 per cent of all scientific research and
experimentation is Federally funded."'1 5 The argument in the
House Report about the statutory exemption in the Hatch-Waxman
Act is particularly interesting because in that legislation, Congress
was responding to a Federal Circuit case from 1984 which
confronted the experimental use exception: Roche Products v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical.10 6 In Roche, the Federal Circuit rejected
Bolar's argument that its use of patented drugs in order to ensure
FDA approval of generic drugs (meant to hit market immediately
after the patent expired) was experimental use, because of its
commercial purpose. 10 7 Congress overturned this decision by
including a narrow statutory research exemption in the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which established that "the use of a patented
invention in preparation for the submission of data to the Food and
Drug Administration in connection with approval for marketing a
drug was not an act of patent infringement," thus shielding some
102 Id. ("It only stands to reason in this public-private partnership that
government and university scientists should not be confused about the
permissible parameters of their research and experimentation. Clarity about
research will promote competitiveness and creativity.").
103 Id.
104 Id. at 35.
105 Id. at 33.
106 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
107 Id.
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biomedical and pharmaceutical research from being considered
infringement. 10 8 Using the PVPA and Hatch-Waxman Act as
examples, the House Report argued that both common law and
congressional tradition supported a strong research exemption to
protect basic research.
The report accompanying the Patent Competitiveness Act
therefore provides clear guidance as to how legislators perceived
the common law research exemption: the parameters of the
exemption were murky, yes, but legislators considered the
exemption itself to be well-established and completely necessary.
Because the bill contains a research exemption fashioned after the
common law exemption, the provisions contained in the bill
provide some indication as to what legislators believed the
parameters of the common law exemption were and should be.
They certainly believed an exemption existed, and that it should
cover experiments to "research on" and "design around" patented
technology.
Indeed, even the main critic of the bill, Representative
Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), recognized the existence of the common
law exemption in his dissenting remarks (in fact, as a reason not to
legislate an exemption):
I am aware that since 1813, the doctrine of
"experimental purpose" has been recognized as an
exemption to patent infringement. Throughout the
years, U.S. courts have recognized that making or
using a patented invention for the purpose of
studying or analyzing how the invention works has
not given rise to patent infringement liability, so
long as this is done in a way which does not directly
interfere with the commercial interests of the
patentee. This long standing legal principle is sound
and is a recognized feature of the patent system. I
am not aware of any reason to believe that there is
a need for Congress to codify this doctrine. 1
09
To Moorhead, Title IV was unnecessary not only because of the
existing common law exemption, but also because it sought to
protect university research which he could not perceive as
endangered:
The stated purpose of this title is to protect
university research activity. I fail to understand
what universities are being protected from. There
292
108 H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 34.
109 Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
2009-2010
24
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol12/iss1/7
THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RESEARCH
EXEMPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO BIOTECH LAW AND POLICY
has never been a case, to my knowledge, where a
university has been sued for patent infringement for
carrying on research on a patented invention. If the
existing patent law is harming universities or
interfering with their research, I believe they should
come forward and explain the nature of the
problem.
110
At the time, it may have seemed unthinkable that a
university would be sued for its basic research activities involving
patented technology. And in any case, the bill evidently was not at
the forefront of Congress's agenda: the Patent Competitiveness
Act, like its predecessor the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform
Act, languished in Congress for several years without being
passed,"' probably due in part to the defeat of its main proponent,
Kastenmeier, in the 1990 primary election. 112 In the coming years,
as the biotechnology sector failed to live up to both positive and
negative expectations, biotechnology policy fell off of the public
agenda, and a statutory research exemption fell away with it.
113
However, there were hints-particularly in Roche v. Bolar-that if
confronted with an experimental use defense, the Federal Circuit
would construe the research exemption strictly and narrowly.
These hints foreshadowed future judicial decisions that would
dramatically alter researchers' understanding of the common law
exception, spurred on by something that may have been
unimaginable to Moorhead and his contemporaries: a university
was sued for its research work.
IV. 2000s: JUDICIAL EVISCERATION OF THE COMMON
LAW EXEMPTION
While the controversies surrounding biotechnology played
out in the 1980s, changes in the federal court system were taking
place-specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was created in 1982.114 The Federal Circuit has subject matter
jurisdiction over patent appeals from U.S. district courts. Its
decisions in patent cases are crucial, because they are binding
11° Id. at 57.
... See H.R. REP. No. 102-18, at 334 (1991) ("In the Second Session of the 101st
Congress, the Subcommittee developed and the full Committee reported
legislation (Title IV of H.R. 5598) to provide a research exemption to the patent
laws of the United States. The bill was not considered in the House, and activity
may resume on this matter in this Session.").
112 Kevles, supra note 71, at 28.
113 Id. at 28-29.
114 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 165, 96 Stat.
25, 50 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).
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precedent in district courts throughout the United States. Indeed,
shortly after coming into existence, the Federal Circuit had the
opportunity to create binding precedent on the scope of the
research exemption in Roche v. Bolar,115 although its decision to
interpret the common law research exemption extremely narrowly
was overturned quickly by Congress. In the early 2000s, the
Federal Circuit had new opportunities to rule on the scope of the
common law research exemption-and the court has clarified just
how narrow it perceives the exemption to be.
After Roche v. Bolar, the next experimental use case to
come up in the Federal Circuit was Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp.116 Embrex had a patent on a method of
inoculating chicks against diseases before they hatched; Service
Engineering evaluated the patented method in an effort to design
around it.117 Because Service Engineering planned to compete with
Embrex, the Federal Circuit held that its use of the patented
technology was impermissible commercial use that could not be
protected by the research exemption.
118
This case could have come out either way: on the one hand,
because Service Engineering intended to eventually profit from
designing around Embrex's technology, its experiments with the
technology may not have been experimental use under Justice
Story's original formulation. 1 9 But on the other hand, the patent
bargain requires patentees to disclose their inventions so that
others might invent new and better methods around the technology,
not so that patentees can stifle attempts to design around it. The
facts of Embrex might actually be a "paradigm case of exempted
experimental use": the researchers at Service Engineering were
using the technology only to understand how to avoid
infringement, and the intent to profit was only remotely related to
the use.120 In any case, Embrex reaffirmed that the Federal Circuit
would not permit an experimental use defense if the alleged
infringer would receive commercial gain and eventual profit from
experimenting with patented technology. But what about
functionally non-commercial research by nonprofit entities? The
Federal Circuit illustrated just how remote the commercial
connection that barred the experimental use defense could be in
115 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). It is not completely clear why the exemption
is brought up so infrequently as a defense, but speculation suggests that the
exemption's track record of failure in federal courts may explain why
defendants do not raise it as an affirmative defense as frequently as, say, patent
invalidity.
1 1 7 
Id. at 1346-47.
118 Id. at 1349.
119 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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two subsequent cases: Madey v. Duke University12 1 and Integra
LifeSciences v. Merck.
122
A. Madey v. Duke
The facts and posture of Madey are worth discussing in
some detail. John Madey had formerly worked for (and directed)
Duke University's Free Electron Laser lab, and invented and
owned certain equipment used in the lab. 123 Prior to the lawsuit,
Madey and Duke had a particularly vicious falling out, Madey left
the lab, and Duke University scientists continued using his
patented equipment in non-commercial research. 124 In addition to
suing Duke on employment-related claims, Madey sued Duke for
patent infringement stemming from the continued use of his
equipment. The North Carolina district court dismissed the patent
infringement claim on summary judgment, based in part on the
experimental use defense presented by Duke and its lawyers:
Duke's use of the technology was exempt because it was in the
course of non-commercial, not-for-profit research.
125
The Federal Circuit reviewed this judgment. Madey argued
for an extremely narrow interpretation of experimental use, which
would make any beneficial use of the patent infringing; 126 Duke
countered that the experimental use defense protected the
university's basic, non-commercial scientific research. 127 Both
Duke 128 and the district court 12 9 cited Ruth v. Stearns-Roger
Manufacturing Co.-a 1935 case in which the research exemption
protected the Colorado School of Mines regarding its experiments
with patented technology-as evidence that basic university
research was protected by longstanding precedent.
130
The Federal Circuit ultimately rejected Duke's arguments,
overturning Ruth in the process. Not only did the court reaffirm
121 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
122 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This Article will only generally cover the
holdings of Madey and Integra, in order to demonstrate how they conflict with
legislators' understanding of the common law exemption. There is already a
wealth of scholarship on the ramifications of these cases for the common law
exemption. See, e.g., Caltrider & Davis, supra note 32; Chester G. Moore,
Comment, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 151, 163-68 (2006); Mueller, supra note 17, at 936-61.
123 See Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97CV1170, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21379,
at *2-3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 1999).124 Id. at *6.
125 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
126 Appellant's Reply Brief at 7-13, Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (No. 01-1567).
127 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 15-22, Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (No. 01-1567).
12
1 Id. at 22.129 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
130 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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prior holdings that no commercial use is protected by the
exemption, it also established that even an extremely remote
relationship between the use and the profit might prevent
utilization of the experimental use defense:
Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is
in any way commercial in nature. Similarly, our
precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in
keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate
business, regardless of commercial implications.
For example, major research universities, such as
Duke, often sanction and fund research projects
with arguably no commercial application
whatsoever. However, these projects unmistakably
further the institution's legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening
students and faculty participating in these projects.
These projects also serve, for example, to increase
the status of the institution and lure lucrative
research grants, students and faculty.
In short, regardless of whether a particular
institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for
commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance
of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is
not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or
nonprofit status of the user is not determinative.
In the present case, the district court attached too
great a weight to the nonprofit, educational status of
Duke, effectively suppressing the fact that Duke's
acts appear to be in accordance with any reasonable
interpretation of Duke's legitimate business
objectives. On remand, the district court will have
to significantly narrow and limit its conception of
the experimental use defense. The correct focus
should not be on the nonprofit status of Duke but on
the legitimate business Duke is involved in and
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satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.1
3 '
The Federal Circuit thus held that experimentation or research in
the university setting with "no commercial application
whatsoever" may not be protected by the research exemption
because of the university's business of attracting students, faculty,
and grants. At least when researchers could rely on the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial work, there was some
guidance as to which activities would be protected. After Madey,
only the old, vague guidelines protecting experiments for
"philosophical inquiry" and "idle curiosity" remained, creating
more confusion for nonprofit researchers than there may have been
before the holding. As one commentator has put it, under the strict
test in Madey, "it appears that any use of patented tools by
researchers and faculty engaged in the constant pursuit of funding,
whether in the form of research grants or licensing arrangements
for inventions developed at the institution, is unlikely to be
experimental use."
' 32
Duke immediately petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari, identifying a number of concerns: first, that all nonprofit
research institutions, because they are in the business of seeking
grants and attracting researchers, would no longer be eligible for
the research exemption. Second, Duke argued that the
unavailability of the defense would create high licensing demands
and transactions costs for nonprofits facing a thicket of corporate
patents in the way of their research. 133 The Supreme Court took
some interest in these arguments, and invited the Solicitor General
to submit a brief on the issue of whether certiorari should be
granted.
134
The Solicitor General's brief recommended that the petition
for certiorari be denied, which it ultimately was. 135 The brief
reasoned that the Federal Circuit ruling was not directly
antagonistic to prior experimental use precedent, nor was it an
inaccurate ruling given the facts of Madey's case. 136 The
arguments in the brief are also direct evidence that the model of
131 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
132 Melissa J. Alcorn, Note, Biotechnology Law: A Tale of Peptides and Lasers:
Is Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA the End of the Experimental Use
Defense for Biomedical Innovation, or Does § 271(e) (1) of the Patent Act Save
the Day?, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 381, 387 (2004).
133 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Duke Univ. v.
Madey, 538 U.S. 959 (2003) (No. 02-1007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/2002-1007.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
134 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 538 U.S. 959 (2003).
135 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
136 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 133, at 6-13.
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university patenting promoted by the Bayh-Dole Act rendered the
research exemption untenable, at least in the view of the
Department of Justice. The brief states that after Bayh-Dole, the
university's role as a center of non-commercial research was no
longer "clear-cut" given the rise of deep university-industry
partnerships, and that universities and other research institutions
deserved no blanket exemption as a result.13 7 Not-for-profit
research institutions were no longer primarily considered centers
for advancement of human knowledge, but rather became
institutions with deep corporate ties and conflicts of interest. The
advent of biotechnology, the Bayh-Dole duty to commercialize,
and the lack of clearly defined exempt uses combined to create a
perfect storm, jeopardizing the continuation of basic research in
even the most independent settings.
Nevertheless, the Solicitor General stated that the
experimental use defense might be ripe for legislative (as opposed
to judicial) consideration. The brief identified the "weighty
concerns" raised by Duke about the scope of permissible research
and the feasibility of licensing, and identified Congress as the
authority most capable of evaluating those concerns and creating a
solution. 3 8  The brief identified the Hatch-Waxman Act
(Congress's response to Roche v. Bolar), the Transgenic Animal
Patent Reform Act, and the Patent Competitiveness Act as
evidence of Congress's willingness and ability to address the
experimental use exception if necessary. 139 After certiorari was
denied, universities were left questioning whether their activities
were protected research, and unfortunately, the legislature took no
immediate action to clarify.
B. Integra LifeSciences v. Merck
Integra is less instructive for this study because the
research exemption was ultimately determined to be a collateral
issue by the majority of the Federal Circuit panel. 14 Moreover, the
Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Federal Circuit decision
in favor of the defendants, but on grounds not involving the
1 3 7 
Id. at 12-13.
138 Id. at 15-16. The Solicitor General discussed the judiciary's ability to address
these concerns: "Indeed, it seems improbable that a 190-year-old, judge-made
defense with little rooting in any statutory text could anticipate the challenges of
the modern academic and research environment and adequately accommodate
the competing policy concerns raised by the parties in this case."
139 Id. at 16-17 (citing the Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); the
Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, H.R. 4970, § 2, 100th Cong. (1988); and
the Patent Competitiveness Act, H.R. 5598, § 402, 101st Cong. (1990)).
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experimental use debate. 14 1 Nevertheless, in the Federal Circuit
case, the dissenting judge, Judge Newman, offered an interesting
view of the experimental use exemption that merits discussion,
particularly in view of some recent developments in biotechnology
and some of the recently proposed solutions for the research
exemption problem.
The facts of Integra are somewhat complex, but essentially
involve the experiments of a scientist, David Cheresh, at the
(nonprofit) Scripps Research Institute. Integra had a patent directed
toward recombinantly-roduced peptides (RGD peptides) and
certain uses for them,' 4 chiefly for healing wounds and adhering
prosthetics, although Integra was never successful in
commercializing its patents. 143 Cheresh discovered a new use for
certain forms of the RGD peptides: inhibiting blood vessel growth,
which could have profound implications for inhibiting cancerous
tumor growth. 144 Recognizing the possibilities of this technology,
Merck, a German pharmaceutical company, entered into an
agreement with Scripps to develop it. 
145
The majority did not discuss experimental use, 146 but in her
dissent, Judge Newman expressed the opinion that the
experimental use exception would have properly protected some of
Cheresh's early work.147 Judge Newman expressed her concern
that the "right to [use patented technology to] conduct research to
achieve [basic] knowledge need not, and should not, await
expiration of the patent," and her frustration at the majority's
decision to further "disapprove[] and essentially eliminate[] the
common law research exemption."'148 Judge Newman distinguished
"research" from "development," and stated that the exemption
should protect the former:
[T]here is a generally recognized distinction
between "research" and "development," as a matter
of scale, creativity, resource allocation, and often
the level of scientific/engineering skill needed for
141 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
142 Integra, 331 F.3d at 862-63.
143 Mueller, supra note 17, at 949-50.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Integra, 331 F.3d at 864 n.2 (stating that the experimental use exemption was
not before them in the case, but suggesting that even if it had been briefed or
argued, "the Patent Act does not include the word 'experimental,' let alone an
experimental use exemption from infringement").
147 Id. at 874. (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that "either the common law
research exemption or the development associated with § 271(e)(1) immunity
embraces all of [the allegedly infringing] activities").148 Id. at 873.
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the project; this distinction may serve as a useful
divider, applicable in most situations. Like "fair
use" in copyright law, the great variety of possible
facts may occasionally raise dispute as to particular
cases. However, also like fair use, in most cases it
will be clear whether the exemption applies.
149
Despite leaving the parameters of the exemption open, Judge
Newman did give some guidance as to the types of research
activity that should be protected:
The subject matter of patents may be studied in
order to understand it, or to improve upon it, or to
find a new use for it, or to modify or "design
around" it. Were such research subject to
prohibition by the patentee the advancement of
technology would stop, for the first patentee in the
field could bar not only patent-protected
competition, but all research that might lead to such
competition, as well as barring improvement or
challenge or avoidance of patented technology.
Today's accelerated technological advance is based
in large part on knowledge of the details of patented
inventions and how they are made and used.
Prohibition of research into such knowledge cannot
be squared with the framework of the patent law.
150
Judge Newman's language is evocative of the "research
on"/"research with" dichotomy that has been advanced by many
scholars, including Rebecca S. Eisenberg and the National
Research Council, 151 and is also evocative of the protected uses
outlined in the statutory exemption contained in the Patent
Competitiveness Act.152 Under Judge Newman's formulation, pre-
commercial research on the technology as an end in itself-
intended to help researchers understand the invention or avoid
infringement-would be exempted, while research using the
technology as a tool or a means to another end would be
infringement.
149 Id. at 876 (footnote omitted).
150 Id. at 875.
151 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 957-59; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CRH. L. REV.
1017, 1074-75 (1989); Report of the National Institutes of Health Working
Group on Research Tools Appendix D (June 4, 1998), http://www.nih.gov/
news/researchtools/appendd.htm.
152 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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The majority opinion in Integra was ultimately vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court on other grounds, and in any case,
Judge Newman's dissent would have had no precedential force.
153
However, the dissent reflects the desperate need for guidance in
delineating the bounds of the research exemption: even a basic,
vague line between "research" and "development" might aid
researchers and courts in their application and assessment of
permissible research activities. As the Federal Circuit was
narrowing the experimental use exception in the legal sphere, new
challenges for experimental use were arising in the scientific
world. The patenting of genes and genetic sequences was in full
swing. And as the 2000s continued, the tension between gene
patents and the progress of basic research would further illustrate
the need for clear guidelines to govern not-for-profit research on
patented technology.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY
The need for clarification of the research exemption has
been heightened by the rise of gene patenting, as new questions
arise about how researchers can use basic DNA strands to do
beneficial research on health and disease. The history of gene
patenting has been written elsewhere; 154 suffice it to say that since
around the year 2000, the Patent Office has granted patents on
small strands of complementary DNA-not on methods of using
them, but on the fragments themselves-allegedly because a
human's actions in isolating and purifying the fragments renders
them patentable. 155 Gene patenting has held great promise for the
biotechnology industry, but has also generated objections from
groups with moral and ethical concerns about patenting sequences
found naturally in human and animal bodies.
Deep controversies have arisen surrounding gene
patenting. 156 Some of the most troubling questions implicate the
153 For more in-depth discussion of the Integra case and the research exemption,
see Alcorn, supra note 132; Rebecca Lynn, Note, Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd.: Judicial Expansion of 271(e) (1) Signals a Need for a Broad
Statutory Experimental Use Exemption in Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
79 (2006).
154 See KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME: INSIDE THE RACE To UNLOCK
HUMAN DNA (2001); Daniel J. Kevles & Ari Berkowitz, The Gene Patenting
Controversy: A Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 233 (2001).
155 See Andrews, supra note 15, at 803.
156 See supra note 154. For another thorough and recent overview of the gene
patenting controversies, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-
Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. NI, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/ouellette-access-to-bio-knowledge.pdf.
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fate of basic research on these genes and sequences, many of
which are correlated with predisposition to certain health problems
or diseases. Most obviously, there is no way to "invent around" a
particular genetic sequence. Researchers who wish to work on
genetic therapy or diagnostic testing related to a patented gene
fragment often cannot do so without infringing the patent. 157 A
patent on a gene sequence can hinder research on the technology
and attempts at the development of tests and therapy around it; any
progress that occurs must happen in the labs and by the employees
of the patentee and its licensees.
As with every new advancement in biotechnology,
members of Congress attempted to legislate a research exemption,
this time one that would allow non-commercial research on
patented genes. The Genomic Research and Diagnostic
Accessibility Act of 2002158 would have protected the use of
patented genetic information in the course of "systematic
investigation, including research development, testing, and
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge," as well as use of the patented sequence in the creation
of "any test, designed to detect disease, to predict the potential for
a medical disorder, or to predict the effectiveness of
therapeutics."' 159 But like nearly every other attempt to legislate a
statutory research exemption, the bill was never acted on after
being referred to committee, and it expired at the end of that
session of Congress. 160 Another bill, the Genomic Research and
Accessibility Act of 2007,161 sought to remedy the research
problems by prohibiting gene patenting altogether, 162 but it, too,
died after being referred to committee.
163
Confusion about the scope of permissible research may
deter researchers from doing work on patented genes: after a patent
was granted on a gene pertaining to hemochromatosis, thirty
percent of the U.S. laboratories surveyed ceased their work on it.
164
Many other researchers also report stopping their work after
learning that a patent has been granted, or after being contacted by
the patent holder with threats of suit or offers of exorbitant
157 Andrews, supra note 15, at 804.
158 H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
159 Id. §§ 2(E), 3(F).
160 Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967,
107th Cong., available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl07-
3967.
161 H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).
162 153 CONG. REC. E315-05 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Becerra).
163 Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong., available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-977.
164 Andrews, supra note 15, at 805.
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licensing fees. 165 In any event, the effects of confusion deter
beneficial competition and development, perhaps not for the most
brazen researchers, but for enough researchers that it is a serious
problem. 166 Restrictions on basic research threaten to stunt
advances in technology that could have profound effects both for
public health and for economic growth. The confusion about the
permissibility of basic research on DNA fragments remains.
Gene patents are only one subset of biotechnology patents
which seem to be affected by the murky research exemption.
Although recent scholarship has indicated that patents and patent
infringement suits may not be the most serious obstacle that
scientific researchers face in their efforts to access and use
patented technology, 167 the extant confusion created by the unclear
exemption is terrible policy for a host of reasons. Researchers and
universities are somewhat less likely to engage in activity which
might be infringing; excessive licensing breeds high prices and
transactions costs that may be transferred to the government and
the public funding the research; 168 there is also the possibility that
basic research that would otherwise take place in U.S. labs is being
taken on by countries with robust and clear research exemptions. 169
Even if many researchers are not afraid of being sued for their
work with patented technology, the norms which might be keeping
researchers from being sued could one day be violated (envision
another Myriad, or worse, universities suing one another over their
patent portfolios).
Up to this point, this Article has attempted to point out the
tensions between congressional understanding of experimental use
and judicial understanding of experimental use. The two branches
seem to be talking past one another: in the past half-century, judges
have stated that a broader exemption could only be created by the
legislature, while various legislators have relied on the existence of
a common law exemption in deciding whether to support or amend
a statutory exemption. Adding to the mess, important advances in
biotechnology-most recently, the technology involved in gene
patents-have resulted in broad patents that may be having a
chilling effect on the continuation of basic research, particularly
165 Id.
166 Although Ouellette's research demonstrates that the patent problem may be
overstated, she also notes that some studies indicate that "DNA patents are
limiting both the availability of testing and the development of new genetic
tests." Ouellette, supra note 156, 56.
167 See id.
168 See Maurice Cassier, Private Property, Collective Property, and Public
Property in the Age of Genomics, 54 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 83, 90-91 (2002).
169 See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 717-19 (2002) (discussing the possibility of
outsourcing as a result of the lack of a research exemption in the United States).
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since Madey and Integra, which rendered the parameters of
exempted non-commercial research even more unclear. This Part
will provide a brief overview of a few of the solutions and
alternatives that scholars and policymakers have advanced for the
research exemption problem, suggestions which would protect the
continuation of basic research without damaging the value and the
incentives that the patent system provides. Although I discuss the
arguments made for different types of solutions generally-in
other words, the solutions recommended below could cover
research using all patented technologies-many of these solutions
could in theory be narrowed to specifically address the
biotechnology sector.
A. Liability Rules
One of the solutions that has been proposed by scholars
such as Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Janice M. Mueller would be to
change the rule protecting the patentee's intellectual property from
a property rule to a liability rule; 170 a property rule protects an
owner's rights against any non-consensual use of the property,
while a liability rule permits non-consensual use with the payment
of damages after-the-fact. 17' The liability rule would not permit a
broad research exemption, but it would allow courts to examine
uses of patented technology case-by-case, balancing the harm to
the patent owner against the scope, nature, and necessity of use by
the infringer, and adjusting damages accordingly. This approach
has been advocated by Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit.
7 2
In its recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,
the Supreme Court held that injunctions are not an automatic
remedy for patent infringement, and the Court suggested that a
balance-of-harms approach and adjusted damages may be more
appropriate in particular cases. 17 3 The public interest in the
progress of basic research and improvements in public health thus
might make a liability rule a good substitute for the experimental
use exception, by permitting non-commercial university and
nonprofit researchers to use technology in de minimis, non-
commercial ways that would likely not cause great damages.
However, there are two obvious problems: first, while assessing
170 Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1078; Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante
Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 54-57 (2001).
171 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1089 (1972).
172 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 934-36 (discussing Judge Rader's arguments
for a similar rule in Embrex and Integra).
173 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006).
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damages on past research may be possible, valuing the damages
caused by prospective or ongoing experimentation may be very
difficult; 74 and second, the patent holder's uncertain ability to
wield exclusive control over use and licensing of the patent will
make the patent far less valuable and will also damage the overall
value of the incentives provided by the patent system. 1
75
B. A "Fair Use" Exemption
While Justice Story is famous for creating the experimental
use exception that is the topic of this Article, he is also responsible
for creating another intellectual property doctrine: copyright fair
use.176 Copyright fair use allows certain users to reproduce
copyrighted material without permission, under limited
circumstances. Though the doctrine originated at common law, it
was somewhat murky (as experimental use is today); hence, in the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress enacted a fair use exemption
meant to codify the existing common law standard. 177 The
Copyright Act provides that a court considering whether a
defendant's use is "fair use" and thus not copyright infringement
should consider four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
178
Many scholars have suggested that patent law might benefit
from a "fair use" type exemption, in which courts could use a
multi-factor test to determine whether a defendant's use of
patented technology should be protected or not. 179 An exemption
174 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 979.
175 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MrNN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001).
176 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Copyright fair use is distinct from trademark fair use, discussed briefly in my
discussion of the PVPA above. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
177 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[1] (2009).
178 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
179 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human
DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for
Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623,
1687 (2001); Mueller, supra note 170, at 42; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a
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could look very similar to the "four factors" test of copyright law:
for example, courts could consider the purpose of the use of the
patented technology, the amount of the use, and so on in
determining whether a defendant's activities would be permissible
research or impermissible infringement. 180 The test could be
created through either legislative guidance or common law
decisions. An unambiguous, "fair use" style research exemption in
patent law would help ensure that creation and sharing would still
be incentivized, and would also protect the valid interests of the
patentee in the fruits of his or her hard work.
However, the suggestion to create a "fair use" affirmative
defense is not without its problems. It is a broad solution requiring
significant legislative or judicial action that risks unintended
consequences and might result only in added complexity and
confusion. 18 1 It may also be expensive. Although some have
alleged that creating a clear exemption would reduce litigation and
the costs of case-by-case adjudication and modification of an
unclear research exemption, 182 one could envision another scenario
in which defendants would be more encouraged to present the
defense or bring declaratory judgment actions, and hence, litigation
might increase as courts build a body of "experimental use"
precedent. There are also problems with the complexity of the
evidence to be considered. Although factors like the "amount of
use" are comparatively easy to judge in copyrightable works, in the
patent scenario, courts might be confronted with particularly
detailed, scientific, and subjective documents and testimony on the
amount and purpose of use, further increasing the cost of
litigation. 183 Courts would also have to face "difficult pricing
decisions" to decide the scope, amount, and intent of the use, in
order to perform the balancing test. 184 Furthermore, the current
process, which provides courts with flexibility in computing
damages for infringement, may already provide a sort of multi-
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLuM. L. REv. 1177, 1205 (2000)
("The preceding analysis identified five factors relevant to a fair use finding: (i)
the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; (ii) the purpose of the
infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a
license from being concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on the patentee's
incentives and overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented work.
While this test resembles that of copyright fair use, it diverges to reflect the
different incentive scheme of patent."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 151, at
1018 n.6. ("The U.S. copyright laws also exempt some research uses of
copyrighted works from infringement liability under the 'fair use' doctrine.").180 See O'Rourke, supra note 179, at 1230-3 1.




184 Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time
for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 470 (2004).
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factor test which protects de minimis, nonprofit researchers from
having to pay large damages to patent holders, 8 5 rendering a "fair
use"-type defense redundant given the significant trouble creating
a new fair use doctrine might entail.
C. Compulsory Licensing, Non-exclusive Licensing, and
Patent Pools
Patent pools and compulsory licenses are traditional tools
of patent law that could be harnessed to ensure the continuation of
valued research, and this approach has been advocated by Lori
Andrews as well as the National Research Council Committee on
Science, Technology, and Law. 186 Similar consortia and collective
licensinf programs have been utilized with great success in
Europe. Patent pools are agreements in which two or more
patent holders agree to license their technology to one another (or
to third parties for a set fee). These agreements prevent parties
seeking to use the technologies from having to seek licenses from
each individual patentee. Because of the existing norms of sharing
and scholarship in academia, universities and nonprofits who
invent technology might be predisposed to make commitments to
join these voluntary associations.
As a similar alternative, the norms in the scientific
community could be utilized to promote non-exclusive licensing of
university- or nonprofit-developed technology. This approach
might require universities and nonprofits to sacrifice the high
payments that come with exclusive licenses, but non-exclusive
licensing could promote more widespread research and
development on and around patented work. Although it would be
more difficult, some scholars have advocated that the non-
exclusivity reforms go even further: using public domain projects
such as the Human Genome Project and some components of
pharmaceutical research as examples, they have suggested that
basic research in universities and nonprofits that is funded by the
public go directly into the public domain.18 8 This would require
revision of the Bayh-Dole Act, but one could imagine a revision
185 See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Rader, J., concurring).186 Andrews, supra note 15, at 807; cf NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 14-15
(2006) (recommending that "NIH ... undertake a study of potential university,
government, and industry arrangements for the pooling and cross-licensing of
genomic and proteomic patents, as well as research tools").
187 See Cassier, supra note 168, at 94-95.
188 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public v. Proprietary Science: A
Fruitful Tension?, 131 DAEDALUS 89, 100 (2002).
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permitting and requiring universities to pursue patent protection for
applications of basic research, but not for the results of basic
research and new knowledge itself. 1
89
Compulsory licensing, in contrast, requires no volunteerism
on the part of the patent holder; instead, the government can grant
a license on a patent to serve the public interest.190 The march-in
rights in the Bayh-Dole Act would clearly seem to give the
government this ability, but to date, these rights have not been
utilized. 191 The obvious problem with this and all of the
licensing/pooling approaches is that they require volunteer,
collective, or administrative actions, all of which are susceptible to
high transactions costs and inertia.
D. Legislation
With the common law research exemption in its current
state, the best choice would be congressional action to legislate a
research exemption. In the past, Congress has legislated
exemptions for certain types of possibly infringing activity
involving patented technology when matters of life and health are
at stake: Congress has protected research use of germplasm in the
PVPA, drug experimentation in the Hatch-Waxman Act, and most
recently, it has exempted doctors using patented surgical
procedures from being sued for infringement. 192 A legislative
research exemption has been advocated by nearly every single
scholar who has considered the problems inherent in the current
system. 193 The exception could be narrowly drawn-for example,
protecting only genetic testing or certain types of research on
certain biotechnologies-or it could guide all basic research in the
field of public health.
As this paper has shown, for the past century, nearly every
scholar, legislator, and judge to consider what kinds of
experimentation and research should be protected has agreed upon
two broad categories: (1) research on the patented technology and
(2) research to design around the technology. The National
189 See id.
190 Andrews, supra note 15, at 807.
191 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 186, at 96.
192 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-67 to -68 (1996) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006)).
193 See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 186, at 14; Andrews, supra
note 15, at 806-07; Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal To Amend the
Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) To Allow Health Care Providers To Examine
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Research Council Committee has drafted four useful guidelines
that outline the work which it believes should be exempted:
[M]aking or using a patented invention should not
be considered infringement if done to discern or to
discover:
a) the validity of the patent and scope of
afforded protection;
b) the features, properties, or inherent
characteristics or advantages of the
invention;
c) novel methods of making or using the
patented invention; or
d) novel alternatives, improvements, or
substitutes.' 
94
Such an exemption would seem to protect both the patentee's
interests and the user's. Research with the patented technology for
commercial development would be infringing, but research
incidental to commercial business-for example, in the course of
developing an alternative, or ascertaining the veracity of the
patent's specifications-would not.1
95
While any proposed legislation would require extensive
hearings and the input of judges, scholars, researchers, and private
firms, 96 the suggestions already contained in past judicial opinions
and legislative history are a good start. A clear exemption would
ultimately benefit not only public health and non-commercial
biotechnology research, but would also help private, commercial
industry. Such an exemption would offer patent holders better
guidance as to when they should pursue costly and time-
consuming enforcement of their patents, and when enforcement
would be unsuccessful or inappropriate. Moreover, clearly defined
exempt uses would allow patent holders to cut through the thicket
of both commercial and non-commercial researchers that may be
using their technology, allowing them to focus on strategically
licensing their patents to those engaging in non-exempt work.
CONCLUSION
There is a complex web of law and policy surrounding
biotechnology and the university's role in basic biotech research:
at best, this Article has strived to identify some of the incongruities
194 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 186, at 14.
195 Id.
196 The difficulties in outlining the scope of such an exemption are briefly
discussed in Eisenberg & Nelson, supra note 188.
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between Congress's historical understanding of the common law
research exemption and the narrow judicial reality, and how these
misunderstandings have ultimately resulted in confusion that is
affecting researchers and universities alike. Legislation to protect
basic biotechnology research is necessary.
The ACLU's victory in its suit against Myriad at the district
court level leaves the future of gene patents uncertain. Although
the court decided the case on limited grounds at summary
judgment, namely, the unpatentability of products of nature, 197 it
did not rule out the possibility that gene patents may be impeding
beneficial, basic research, and that further findings of fact might
reveal that to be the case.198 If the ACLU suit survives an appeal
from Myriad, litigation might be enough to effect changes in gene
patenting, but as history has demonstrated, with each new advance
in biotechnology there have been new problems and challenges
implicating the research exemption, and clear legislative policy
going forward would help alleviate the problem. At the very least,
even if the ACLU suit is ultimately unsuccessful, it is possible that
it will draw public attention to the problems inherent in the
obstacles to basic research and will force some legislative action.
While the confusion may not yet have led to a crisis
implicating public health, it would be better to have Congress act
prematurely than to act too late. Since Madey and Integra, given
the importance of continued basic research in biotechnology fields
such as human genetics, a clear, legislated exemption to guide
researchers and the universities and nonprofits that employ them is
badly needed. A clear exemption would free Progress, that lofty
aim of the patent law, from the patents that currently may be
stifling it.
197 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09
Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *108 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
198 Id. at *77.
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